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Abstract
U-shaped learning is a learning behaviour in which the learner ﬁrst learns a given target behaviour, then unlearns it and
ﬁnally relearns it. Such a behaviour, observed by psychologists, for example, in the learning of past-tenses of English verbs,
has been widely discussed among psychologists and cognitive scientists as a fundamental example of the non-monotonicity
of learning. Previous theory literature has studied whether or not U-shaped learning, in the context of Gold’s formal model
of learning languages from positive data, is necessary for learning some tasks.
It is clear that human learning involves memory limitations. In the present paper we consider, then, the question of the
necessity of U-shaped learning for some learning models featuringmemory limitations. Our results show that the question of
the necessity of U-shaped learning in this memory-limited setting depends on delicate tradeoffs between the learner’s ability
to remember its own previous conjecture, to store some values in its long term memory, to make queries about whether or
not items occur in previously seen data and on the learner’s choice of hypotheses space.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction and motivation
In Section 1.1, we explain U-shaped learning and in Section 1.2 memory-limited learning. In Section 1.3, we
summarize our main results of the present paper with pointers to later sections where they are treated in more
detail.
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1.1. U-shaped learning
U-shaped learning occurs when the learner ﬁrst learns a correct behaviour, then abandons that correct be-
haviour and ﬁnally returns to it once again. This pattern of learning has been observed by cognitive and
developmental psychologists in a variety of child development phenomena, such as language learning [6,26,34],
understanding of temperature [34,35], understanding of weight conservation [5,34], object permanence [5,34]
and face recognition [7]. The case of language acquisition is paradigmatic. In the case of the past tense of En-
glish verbs, it has been observed that children learn correct syntactic forms (call/called, go/went), then undergo
a period of overregularization in which they attach regular verb endings such as ‘ed’ to the present tense forms
even in the case of irregular verbs (break/breaked, speak/speaked) and ﬁnally reach a ﬁnal phase in which they
correctly handle both regular and irregular verbs. This example of U-shaped learning behaviour has ﬁgured so
prominently in the so-called “Past Tense Debate” in cognitive science that competing models of human learning
are often judged on their capacity for modelling the U-shaped learning phenomenon [26,31,36]. Recent interest
in U-shaped learning is also witnessed by the fact that the Journal of Cognition and Development dedicated its
ﬁrst issue in the year 2004 to this phenomenon.
While the prior cognitive science literature on U-shaped learning was typically concerned with modelling
how humans achieve U-shaped behaviour, [2,8,9] are motivated by the question of why humans exhibit this
seemingly inefﬁcient behaviour. Is it a mere harmless evolutionary inefﬁciency or is it necessary for full human
learning power? A technically answerable version of this question is: are there some formal learning tasks for
whichU-shaped behaviour is logically necessary? The answer to this latter question requires thatwe ﬁrst describe
some formal criteria of successful learning.
A learning machine M reads an inﬁnite sequence consisting of the elements of any language L in arbitrary
order with possibly some pause symbols # in between elements. During this process the machine outputs a
corresponding sequence e0, e1, . . . of hypotheses (grammars) which may generate the language L to be learned.
Sometimes, especially when numerically coded, we also call these hypotheses indices. A fundamental criterion of
successful learning of a language is called explanatory learning (Ex-learning) and was introduced by Gold [17].
Explanatory learning requires that the learner’s output conjectures stabilize in the limit to a single conjecture
(grammar/program, description/explanation) that generates the input language. Behaviourally correct learning
[12,29] requires, for successful learning, only convergence in the limit to possibly inﬁnitely many syntactically
distinct but correct conjectures. Another interesting class of criteria features vacillatory learning [10,18]. This
paradigm involves learning criteria which allow the learner to vacillate in the limit between at most ﬁnitely
many syntactically distinct but correct conjectures. For each criterion that we consider above (and below), a
non-U-shaped learner is naturallymodelled as a learner that never semantically returns to a previously abandoned
correct conjecture on languages it learns according to that criterion.
Baliga and his co-workers [2] showed that every Ex-learnable class of languages is Ex-learnable by a non-U-
shaped learner, that is, for Ex-learnability, U-shaped learning is not necessary. Furthermore, based on a proof
of Fulk et al. [16], Baliga et al. [2] noted that, by contrast, for behaviourally correct learning [12,29], U-shaped
learning is necessary for full learning power. In [8] it is shown that, for non-trivial vacillatory learning, U-shaped
learning is again necessary (for full learning power).
1.2. Memory-limited learning
It is clear that human learning involves memory limitations. In the present paper, we consider the necessity
of U-shaped learning in formal memory-limited versions of language learning. In the prior literature at least the
following three types of memory-limited learning have been studied.
A most basic concept of memory-limited learning is iterative learning [24,37,38], according to which the
learner reacts to its current data item, can remember its own last conjecture but cannot store any of the strictly
previously seen data items. Iterative learning admits of learning non-trivial classes. For example, the class of
ﬁnite sets is iteratively learnable as is a class of self-describing sets, for example, the class of languages with
the least element coding a grammar for the language. Furthermore, for each m  1, the class of unions of m of
Angluin’s [1] pattern languages is iteratively learnable [11]. The notion of n-feedback learning denotes iterative
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learning where, in addition, the learner can make n simultaneous queries asking whether some datum has been
seen in the past [11,24]. Finally, a learner is called an n-bounded example memory learner [11, 16,24,30] if, besides
reacting to its currently seen data item and remembering its own last conjecture, it is allowed to store in “long
term memory” at most n strictly previously seen data items.
For the present paper, our ﬁrst intention was to study the impact of forbidding U-shaped learning in each
of the above three models of memory-limited learning. So far we have had success for these problems only for
some more restricted variants of the three models. Hence, we now describe these variants.
Our variants of iterative learning are motivated by two aspects of Gold’s model. The ﬁrst aspect is the
absolute freedom allowed regarding the semantic relations between successive conjectures, and between the
conjectures and the input. Many forms of semantic constraints on the learner’s sequence of hypotheses have
been studied in the previous literature (for example, conservativity [1], consistency [1,3], monotonicity [20,39])
and it is reasonable to explore their interplay withU-shaped learning in thememory-bounded setting of iterative
learning. Second, it is well known that the choice of the hypotheses space from which the learner can pick its
conjectures has an impact on the learning power [23,24]. We accordingly also consider herein U-shaped iterative
learning with restrictions on the hypotheses space.
For the case of feedback learning, we introduce and consider a model called n-memoryless feedback learning
which restricts n-feedback learning so that the learner does not remember its last conjecture. These criteria form
a hierarchy of more and more powerful learning criteria increasing in n and, for n > 0, are incomparable to
iterative learning, see Theorem 32 and Remark 25 each in Section 6. The criterion of 0-memoryless feedback
learning is properly contained in the criterion of iterative learning, see Remark 38 in Section 7.
Finally, in Section 7, we introduce a more limited variant of bounded example memory, c-bounded memory
states learning for which the learner does not remember its previous conjecture but can store any one out of c
different values in its long term memory [14,15,22]. For example, when c = 2k , the memory is equivalent to k
bits of memory. By Theorem 37, these criteria form a hierarchy of more and more powerful learning criteria
increasing in c. Furthermore, the comparisons between bounded memory states learning, iterative learning and
memoryless feedback learning are presented in Remark 38.
Our results herein on memory-limited models are presented for Ex-learning. This is, in part, justiﬁed by the
following considerations. In Section 3, Propositions 7 and 8 essentially imply that, for iterative learning, the Ex
case is the only interesting case. In Section 7, Theorem 34 implies that c-bounded memory states behaviourally
correct learning can be replaced by (c + 1)!-bounded memory states Ex-learning.
1.3. Brief summary of main results
In Section 3, we formally deﬁne iterative learning and prove some background facts about it. Furthermore,
we state the basic connections between iterative non-U-shaped learning and iterative U-shaped learning in the
context of behaviourally correct, vacillatory and explanatory learning.
In Section 4, we study the interplay of hypotheses spaces and non-U-shaped learning. An indexed family of
recursive languages L is a class of recursive languages L0,L1,L2, . . . such that the predicate x ∈ Li is uniformly
recursive in both i and x. In this context, i is called an index of Li; this i codes how to algorithmically decide Li .
Angluin [1] noticed the importance of indexed families for learning theory, gave a characterization when such
a class is learnable from positive data and stated that many classes considered in learning theory are indeed
indexed families. Class-preserving language learning by a learner M [23] of an indexed family L is Ex-learning,
where, instead of using an acceptable programming system for making its conjectures, the learner uses some
recursive indexing of L. In particular, the main result of Section 4, Theorem 12, shows that U-shaped learning
is necessary for the full learning power of class-preserving iterative learning [24].
In Section 5 we study, in the context of iterative learning, the relation of the non-U-shapedness constraint to
otherwell-studied constraints on the semanticbehaviour of the learner’s conjectures.We consider class-consistent
learning [1,3], according towhich the learner’s conjectures, on the languages it learns,must generate all the dataon
which they are based.Monotonic learning by amachineM [39] requires that, on any input language L thatM Ex-
learns, a new hypothesis cannot reject an element x ∈ L that a previous hypothesis already included. Theorem 19
shows that class-consistent iterative learners can be turned into iterative non-U-shaped andmonotonic learners.
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In Section 6, we formally deﬁne n-memoryless feedback learning (discussed near the end of Section 1.2) and
consider the impact of forbidding U-shaped learning in this setting. The main result of Section 6, Theorem 30,
shows that U-shaped learning is necessary for the full learning power of n-memoryless feedback learners.
In Section 7, we formally introduce c-bounded memory states learning (also discussed near the end of Section
1.2). The main result of this section, Theorem 35, shows that U-shaped behaviour does not enhance the learning
power of 2-bounded memory states learners. Here, the memory in the c = 2 case is 1 bit of memory; it is open
as to how Theorem 35 goes for c-bounded memory states learners, where c > 2.
In Section 8, we summarize and brieﬂy discuss our main results, and collect open problems.
2. Notation and preliminaries
2.1. Recursion theory background
Any unexplained recursion theoretic notation is from [32]. For general background on recursion theory
we refer the reader to the standard text books [27,28,32,33]. The symbol  denotes the set of natural numbers,
{0, 1, 2, 3, . . .}. The symbols∅,⊆,⊂,⊇ and⊃denote empty set, subset, proper subset, superset andproper superset,
respectively. Cardinality of a set S is denoted by card(S). card(S)  ∗ denotes that S is ﬁnite. The maximum and
minimum of a set are denoted by max(·), min(·), respectively, where max(∅) = 0 and min(∅) = ∞.
We let 〈·, ·〉 stand for Cantor’s computable, bijective mapping 〈x, y〉 = 12 (x + y)(x + y + 1)+ x from × 
onto  [32]. Note that 〈·, ·〉 is monotonically increasing in both of its arguments. We deﬁne 1(〈x, y〉) = x and
2(〈x, y〉) = y .
By ϕ we denote a ﬁxed acceptable numbering (programming system) [32] for the partial-recursive functions
mapping  to . By ϕi we denote the partial-recursive function computed by the program with number i in the
ϕ-system. By  we denote an arbitrary ﬁxed Blum complexity measure [4] for the ϕ-system. A partial recursive
function (·, ·) is said to be a Blum complexity measure for ϕ, iff the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
• for all i and x, (i, x)↓ iff ϕi(x)↓ ;
• the predicate P(i, x, t) ≡ (i, x)  t is decidable.
By convention we usei to denote the partial recursive function x → (i, x). Intuitively,i(x)may be thought
of as the number of steps it takes to compute ϕi(x).
By Wi we denote the domain of ϕi . That is, Wi is the recursively enumerable (r.e.) subset of  accepted by the
ϕ-program i. Note that all acceptable numberings are recursively isomorphic and thus one could also deﬁne Wi
to be the set generated by the ith grammar. The symbol L ranges over the class of r.e. sets. By L, we denote the
complement of L, that is − L. The symbol L ranges over classes containing some, but not necessarily all, r.e.
sets. ByWi,s we denote the set {x < s : i(x) < s}. Similarly, ϕi,s(x) denotes ϕi(x) if x < s andi(x) < s; otherwise
ϕi,s(x) is undeﬁned.
2.2. Explanatory and non-U-shaped learning
We now present concepts from language learning theory [17,18]. The next deﬁnition introduces the concept
of a sequence of data.
Deﬁnition 1.
(a) A sequence  is a mapping from an initial segment of  into ( ∪ {#}). The empty sequence is denoted by
.
(b) The content of a sequence , denoted content(), is the set of natural numbers in the range of .
(c) The length of , denoted by ||, is the number of elements in . So, || = 0.
(d) For n  ||, the initial segment of  of length n is denoted by [n]. So, [0] is .
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(e) We use  ⊆  to denote that  is an initial segment of .
(f) Seg denotes the set of all ﬁnite sequences (initial segments).
Intuitively, the pause-symbol # represents a pause in the presentation of data. We let ,  and  range over
ﬁnite sequences. We denote the sequence formed by the concatenation of  at the end of  by . Sometimes,
we abuse the notation and use x to denote the concatenation of sequence  and the sequence of length 1 which
contains the element x.
We often use a recursive padding function pad(e,X)withWpad(e,X) = We, where—according to the context—X
might be a number, a ﬁnite set or a ﬁnite sequence. In particular, pad is chosen such that e,X can be computed
from pad(e,X) by a recursive function. Such padding functions can easily be constructed [32].
Deﬁnition 2. [17]
(a) A text T for a language L is a mapping from  into ( ∪ {#}) such that L is the set of natural numbers in
the range of T . T(i) represents the (i + 1)–st element in the text.
(b) The content of a text T , denoted by content(T), is the set of natural numbers in the range of T ; that is, the
language which T is a text for.
(c) T [n] denotes the ﬁnite initial segment of T with length n.
We now deﬁne the basic paradigm of learning in the limit, explanatory learning.
Deﬁnition 3. [17] A learnerM : Seg → ( ∪ {?}) is a (possibly partial) recursive function which assigns hypothe-
ses to initial segments. A learner M converges on text T to e, iff M is deﬁned on all initial segments of T and,
for all but ﬁnitely many n, M(T [n]) = e.
M Ex-learns L iff, for every text T for L, M is deﬁned on all initial segments of T , and there is an index n such
that M(T [n]) /= ?,WM(T [n]) = L and M(T [m]) ∈ {M(T [n]), ?} for all m  n. M Ex-learns a class L (equivalently
M is an Ex-learner for L) iff M Ex-learns each L ∈ L. Ex denotes the collection of all classes of languages that
can be Ex-learned.
Intuitively, one canconsider the learnerM as receiving the textT , andoutputting conjecturesM(T [0]),M(T [1]),
M(T [2]), . . . while it is receiving the text. The learner Ex-learns a language if, for any text for the language, the
sequence of conjectures as above converges to a grammar for the language. We say that a learner M has made
a mind change at input T [n+ 1], if M(T [n+ 1]) /= M(T [n]).
For Ex-learnability one may assume, without loss of generality, that the learner is total. However, for some
of the criteria below, such as class consistency and iterative learning, this cannot be assumed without loss of
generality. The requirement for M to be deﬁned on each initial segment of each text for a language in L is also
assumed for learners with other criteria considered below.
Now we deﬁne non-U-shaped learning. A non-U-shaped learner never makes the sequence of correct–
incorrect–correct conjectures while learning a language that it actually learns. Thus, since such a learner has
eventually to output a correct conjecture, one can make the deﬁnition a bit simpler than the idea behind the
notion suggests.
Deﬁnition 4. [2]
(a) Wesay thatM is non-U-shapedon textT , iff, for allnandm > n, ifWM(T [n]) = content(T), then (M(T [m]) =
? or WM(T [m]) = content(T)).
(b) We say that M is non-U-shaped on L iff M is non-U-shaped on each text for L.
(c) We say that M is non-U-shaped on L iff M is non-U-shaped on each L ∈ L.
Deﬁnition 5. Let I be a learning criterion. Then NUShI denotes the collection of all classes L such that there
exists a machine M that learns L according to I and is non-U-shaped on L.
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3. Iterative learning
The Ex-model makes the assumption that the learner has access to the full history of previous data. On the
other hand it is reasonable to think that humans have more or less severe memory limitations. This observation
motivates, among other criteria discussed in the present paper, the concept of iterative learning. An iterative
learner features a severe memory limitation: it can remember its own previous conjecture but not its past data
items. Moreover, each conjecture of an iterative learner is determined as an algorithmic function of the previous
conjecture and of the current input data item.
The formal deﬁnition of an iterative learner is the following.
Deﬁnition 6. [37,38] An iterative learner is a (possibly partial) function M : ( ∪ {?})× ( ∪ {#}) → ( ∪ {?})
together with an initial hypothesis e0 ∈  ∪ {?}. M It -learns a class L iff, for every L ∈ L and every text T for L,
the sequence e0, e1, . . . deﬁned inductively by the rule en+1 = M(en, T(n)) satisﬁes: there exists an m such that em
is an index for L and for all n  m, en ∈ {em, ?}. It denotes the collection of all iteratively learnable classes.
For iterative learners M and for  = (x0, x1, . . . , xn), we sometimes use the notation M() or M(x0, x1, . . . , xn)
to denote the output ofM when fed x0, x1, . . . , xn one after another in that sequence. Thus, one can view iterative
learners as Ex-learners with some constraints on the way hypothesis is computed.
For iterative learners (without other constraints), one may assume without loss of generality that they never
output ?.
It is well known that It ⊂ Ex [38]. For behaviourally correct learning [12,29], where one requires that all but
ﬁnitely many of learner’s conjectures are correct (though they may not be syntactically same), iterative learning
is not a restriction. This can be easily shown using padding, that is, a one-to-one recursive function pad with
Wpad(e,) = We for all initial segments . Given any behaviourally correct learner M for a class L, one can deﬁne
a new learner N on input  implicitly as pad(M(), ). This new learner can explicitly be deﬁned as an iterative
learner by starting with pad(M(), ) and updating via
N(pad(e, ), x) = pad(M(x), x),
where it has the full access to the previous data since it codes this information into the output index. Thus it can
reconstruct the hypothesisM(x) from the old hypothesis pad(e, ) and the new datum x. This simple argument
proves the following Proposition.
Proposition 7. Every behaviourally correct learnable class has an iterative behaviourally correct learner.
By Proposition 7 it does not make sense to consider behaviourally correct iterative learning. So one might
look at restrictions of behaviourally correct learning like the notion of vacillatory learning [10]. In vacillatory
learning, the learner instead of converging to a single grammar for the input language, eventually vacillates
between ﬁnitely many distinct grammars for the language.
The next result shows that relaxing the convergence requirement of iterative learning to vacillatory conver-
gence does not increase learnability at all.
Proposition 8. If some iterative learner M eventually vacillates, on every text of every language in L, between
ﬁnitely many correct hypotheses, then L ∈ It.
Proof.Without loss of generality assume thatM does not output ?. GivenM as above, one deﬁnesN as follows.
N will output grammars of the form: pad(p , S), where S is a ﬁnite set (not containing p), and pad(p , S) is a
padding function such that pad(p , S) is a grammar for Wp , and p , S can be extracted from pad(p , S). Let the
initial hypothesis of N be pad(M(),∅) and the update rule be
N(pad(p , S), x) =
{
pad(p , S), if M(p , x) ∈ S ∪ {p};
pad(M(p , x), S ∪ {p}), otherwise.
We claim that N is an iterative learner for L.
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In the following, by “last brand new hypothesis output by M on ”, we mean, M(), where  is the longest
initial segment of  such that M() /∈ {M() :  ⊂ }.
For any sequence , we will deﬁne a derived sequence  below satisfying the following three conditions.
(I) content() = content(), | |  ||.
(II) If  ⊆ ′, then  ⊆ ′ .
(III) If the last output of N after seeing  is pad(p , S), then
(a) the last brand new hypothesis output by M on  is p ,
(b) the set of programs output by M on initial segments of  is S ∪ {p} and
(c) the last output of M after seeing  is p .
The above properties will be inductively seen to be true, based on length of .
Base case:  = . Clearly, properties (I)–(III) hold for the base case.
Inductive case: Suppose we have deﬁned  . Deﬁne x as follows. SupposeN after seeing  outputs pad(p , S).
Thus, M on initial segments of  , would have output programs from S ∪ {p}, with the output after seeing 
being p (by induction).
If M(p , x) is a program not in S ∪ {p}, then let x = x. Else, let  be initial segment of  such that M , after
seeing  , had output M(p , x). Let  ′ be such that  =  ′. Then, x = x ′. It is easy to verify that properties
(I)–(III) hold in both cases.
Let T be a text for L ∈ L. Let T =⋃n∈ T [n]. It is easy to verify using property (I) that content(T ) =
content(T). Also, since M eventually vacillates between ﬁnitely many correct hypotheses on T , by property
(III), N(T) converges to pad(p , S), where p is the last brand new hypothesis output by M on T , and S is the
set of hypotheses output by M on T , except for the grammar p . Furthermore, by property (III) (c), either M
outputs ﬁnitely many hypothesis on T and p is the last hypothesis output by M on T or p is output by M on
T inﬁnitely often. It follows that N learns L from T . 
Thanks to Propositions 7 and 8 we will, from now on, consider explanatory iterative learners only. All our
notions regarding iterative learning will be modiﬁcations of the basic Ex-learning paradigm. An important
question in this context was whether iterative explanatory learning needs U-shapedness for full learning power.
Quite recently, Case and Moelius [13] solved this important open problem by showing that iterative learning
coincides with its non-U-shaped variant.
Theorem 9. [13] Every iteratively Ex-learnable class has a non-U-shaped iterative Ex-learner.
Together with Proposition 8, one has the following corollary.
Corollary 10. If some iterative learner M eventually vacillates on every text of every language in L between ﬁnitely
many correct hypotheses, then L has a non-U-shaped iterative and explanatory learner.
Our goal is to look at the corresponding question for several related notions, but before doing this, we
want to conclude this section by brieﬂy recalling some basic relations of iterative learning with two criteria of
learning that feature, like non-U-shaped learning, a semantic constraint on the learner’s sequence of
hypotheses.
The ﬁrst such notion is set-driven learning [37], where the hypotheses of a learner on inputs ,  are the same
whenever content() = content().We denote bySDthe collection of all classes learnable by a set-driven learner.
It is shown in [22, Theorem 7.7] that It ⊆ SD. The inclusion is proper since the class of all ﬁnite supersets of {0}
plus the set {1, 2, 3, . . .} has a set-driven learner, but no iterative learner.
A criterion that implies non-U-shapedness is conservative learning [1]. A learner is conservative iff for all
 ⊆ , M() /= M(), implies content() ⊆ WM(). Thus, a conservative learner changes its conjecture only if it
has already seen some datum x not belonging to its conjecture.Consv denotes the collection of all classes having
a conservative learner.
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It is shown in [22] that SD ⊆ Consv, thus, It ⊂ Consv. By deﬁnition, every hypothesis abandoned by a con-
servative learner is incorrect and thus Consv ⊆ NUShEx follows. It is well known that the latter inclusion is
proper. The easiest way to establish it is to use Angluin’s proper inclusion Consv ⊂ Ex [1] and the equality
from Ex = NUShEx [2].
4. Iterative learning and hypothesis spaces
Normally, inGold-style language learning, a learner outputs as hypotheses just indices fromaﬁxed acceptable
enumeration of all r.e. languages, since all types of output (programs, grammars and so on) can be translated into
these indices. There have also been investigations [1,23,24] where the hypotheses space is ﬁxed in the sense that
the learner has to choose its hypotheses either from this ﬁxed space (exact learning) or from a space containing
exactly the same languages (class-preserving learning).
Such a restriction can be severe. For example, the class of all ﬁnite sets is iteratively learnable and so is the class
L of all ﬁnite sets of even cardinality. But if one requires the hypotheses to be from some one–one enumeration
of L, then one forces the learner to output indices which do not uniquely encode information about which data
have been seen so far. This imposes some forgetting which can be used to show that the class L is not exactly
iteratively learnable when the underlying hypotheses space is one–one.
In this section, we investigate ways in which the hypotheses space interferes with non-U-shaped iterative
learnability.
To explain our ﬁrst result we need to recall some notions of computations relative to oracles [32]. Let A be a
set. A partial function f is called computable (recursive) relative toA iff there is an algorithm for f that is allowed
to use answers to questions of the form ‘x ∈ A?’. A is then called an oracle. A total function which is computable
relative to A is also referred to as an A-recursive function; a set B is called A-recursive iff the characteristic function
of B is A-recursive. We say that B is Turing reducible to A, written B T A, in this case.
There exists an acceptable enumeration of all partial functions computable relative to A. Let ϕA0 ,ϕ
A
1 , . . . be
such an enumeration.W Ae denotes the domain of ϕ
A
e .
A(·, ·) denotes a Blum complexitymeasure [4] relative to A,
see [25]. The predicateA(i, x)  t will be no longer recursive, but recursive in A instead.We useAi (x) to denote
A(i, x). LetK be the diagonal halting problem {x ∈  : x ∈ Wx}. Recall thatK is an r.e. set which is not recursive.
Given a set A, one can consider the diagonal halting problem for the partial functions that are computable with
oracle A. Then A′ denotes this diagonal halting problem relativized to A, that is, the set {x ∈  : x ∈ W Ax }. A′ is
called the jump of A. Note that A <T A′ for all sets A. The jump operation can be iterated and so K ′′ denotes the
double jump of the halting problem K .
Instead of considering computable learners, one can consider learners that are computable relative to some
oracle [19]. Our learning models so far feature a symmetry between the complexity of the learner and of the
hypotheses space: the learner is a partial computable function and the hypotheses are indices for partial com-
putable functions. However, when considering learning relative to oracles, one may consider allowing learner
access to anoracleA, but require that the hypotheses be froman enumerationof the partial computable functions.
Relative to the complexity of the learner, the latter requirement can be seen as a limitation on the hypotheses
space.
Our ﬁrst result is a bit atypical, but ﬁts the just described scenario. We consider a learner that is computable
relative to an oracle for K ′, but is asked to use as hypotheses space an acceptable enumeration of programs not
using any oracle. Theorem 11 below shows that the equivalence Ex = NUShEx from [2] does not relativize to
learners that are computable in K ′ but output grammars for recursively enumerable languages; one can also
strengthen the separation to iterative learning. In the following result It[A] (respectively, NUShEx [A]) denotes
the collection of all classes of r.e. languages that are iteratively (respectively, non-U-shapedly explanatory)
learnable by some machine M that has access to the oracle A. Such a machine (as in the deﬁnition of Ex and
It) outputs indices of recursively enumerable languages, and not of languages computed (enumerated) relative
to A.
Theorem 11. It[K ′] ⊆ NUShEx [K ′].
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Proof. For every e, let Le = {〈e, x〉 : x ∈ } and Hi = {〈e, x〉 : x  K ′e (e)}. Note that K ′e (e) is ﬁnite iff e ∈ K ′′.
Now let
L = {Le : e ∈ } ∪ {He : e ∈ K ′′}.
We ﬁrst show that the class L is It[K ′]-learnable. For the following, let e be such that the ﬁrst data seen by the
learner is 〈e, y〉 for some y (if there is no such ﬁrst data, then e is not deﬁned, and we will only be using the ﬁrst
case below). The learner outputs a hypothesis for the set given at the ﬁrst case which applies.
• ∅, if only #s have been seen in the input so far;
• Le, if x < K ′e (e) for all data of the form 〈e, x〉 seen so far;
• He, if x  K ′e (e) for all data of the form 〈e, x〉 seen so far and x = K ′e (e) for some datum 〈e, x〉 seen so far;
• Le, if x > K ′e (e) for some datum of the form 〈e, x〉 seen so far.
During the process the learner can keep track of the ﬁnitely many cases and update its hypothesis accordingly;
within this process it uses twodifferent indices forLe in order tomemorizewhether a datum 〈e, x〉with x > K ′e (e)
has been seen so far or not. It can now easily be veriﬁed that the learner Ex-learns L.
Now, suppose by way of contradiction that M witnesses L ∈ NUShEx [K ′]. For every e, one can compute a
number f(e) such that M(〈e, 0〉〈e, 1〉 . . . 〈e, f(e)〉) outputs an index for Le; this f(e) must exist since M learns L
and the number f(e) can be found using the oracle K ′. Since,M is not U-shaped, it implies that, for any segment
 extending 〈e, 0〉〈e, 1〉 . . . 〈e, f(e)〉, such that content() ⊆ Le,M outputs a grammar for Le. Thus f(e) > K ′e (e),
whenever e ∈ K ′′ (otherwise, M does not identify He). Thus, K ′′ = {e : K ′e (e)  f(e)}, in contradiction to the
fact that K ′′ is not K ′-recursive. 
In the following, the above example is modiﬁed in order to carry over the separation to class-preserving
learning (informally deﬁned in Section 1.3). Lange and Zeugmann [23] introduced class-preserving learning and
studied the dependency of learnability on the hypotheses space. We will introduce a bit of terminology (from
[1]) to explain the notion. An inﬁnite sequence L0,L1,L2, . . . of recursive languages is called uniformly recursive
if the set {〈i, x〉 : x ∈ Li} is recursive. A class L of recursive languages is said to be an indexed family of recursive
languages iff L = {Li : i ∈ } for some uniformly recursive sequence L0,L1,L2, . . .; the latter is called a recursive
indexing of L.
Let L be an indexed family of recursive sets and let H0,H1,H2, . . . be a hypotheses space, where one can
recursively decide (in x and i) whether x ∈ Hi . We say that a machine M explanatorily identiﬁes L with respect
to the hypotheses space H0,H1,H2, . . . iff for every L ∈ L, on every text for L, M converges to some j such that
L = Hj . A machine M class-preserving explanatorily identiﬁes L, if in the above situation {Hi : i ∈ } = L. In
what follows, for a learning criterion I, Icp stands for class-preserving I-learning, the collection of all classes of
languages that can be I-learned by some class-preserving machine.
The following theorem also holds, if, instead of using class preserving indexed family as hypotheses space,
one uses a recursively enumerable class of languages as hypotheses space, where each hypothesis is a member
of the class being learned (that is, for some recursive q, one uses the hypotheses space Wq(0),Wq(1), . . ., and
{Wq(i) : i ∈ } = L).
Theorem 12. There exists an indexed family in Itcp–NUShEx cp.
Proof. Fix an algorithmic enumeration M0,M1, . . . of learners [18]. Let Le = {〈e, x〉 : x ∈ } and let
Lne = {〈e, x〉 : x < 2n or x is odd}. Let Te denote a recursive text such that Te(x) = 〈e, x〉. Let Se =
{〈n, t〉 : (∃ x  n)[Me(Te[n]) is deﬁned within t steps and 〈e, 2x〉 ∈ WMe(Te[2n]),t]}. Now consider the class
L = {Le : e ∈ } ∪ {Lne : Se /= ∅ ∧ 〈n, t〉 = min(Se)}.
The proof is now completed by showing the following two claims.
Claim 13. L ∈ NUShEx cp.
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For proving Claim 13, suppose Me witnesses L ∈ NUShEx cp. Then, as Me learns Le, Se is not empty. Let
〈n, t〉 be the least element of Se. Now WM(Te[2n]) must be a grammar for Le (as no other language in L contains
an element of form 〈e, 2x〉 for x  n). Let T be a text for Lne extending Te[2n]. Now, since Me is non-U-shaped on
L, Me, on T , does not abandon the hypothesis Le since it is consistent with all upcoming data and is a language
in L. Thus Me does not output any grammar for Lne beyond Te[2n]. Thus, Me does not learn Lne although Lne ∈ L.
This completes the proof of Claim 13.
Claim 14. L ∈ Itcp.
For provingClaim 14, let p be a one–one recursive function such that p(e, 0) and p(e, 1) are decision procedures
for Le, and p(e, 2) is a decision procedure for Lne , if Se is not empty and min(Se) = 〈n, t〉 for some t. (Note that
one can easily make an appropriate class preserving hypotheses space using the decision procedures, for each e,
p(e, 0), p(e, 1) and, if Se is not empty, p(e, 2). For ease of notation, we continue to use p(·, ·).)
Now let M be an iterative learner which has the initial hypothesis ?, which keeps every hypothesis, in-
cluding ?, on the datum # and which follows the following update procedure on a datum 〈e, x〉 where
a ∈ {?, p(e, 0), p(e, 1), p(e, 2)}.
M(a, 〈e, x〉) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
p(e, 0), if a = ? or a = p(e, 0) and Se does not intersect with {0, 1, . . . , x};
p(e, 2), if a = p(e, 0) and Se intersects {0, 1, . . . , x};
p(e, 2), if a = p(e, 2), min(Se) = 〈n, t〉 and 〈e, x〉 ∈ Lne ;
p(e, 1), otherwise.
It is easy to verify that if Se is empty, then M on any text for Le outputs only p(e, 0) as its conjecture (besides
initial ?). If Se is non-empty and min(Se) = 〈n, t〉, then, for any text for Le or Lne , M initially outputs ?, then
outputs p(e, 0), and eventually outputs p(e, 2) (after seeing an input 〈e, x〉 such that x  〈n, t〉). Beyond the ﬁrst
time p(e, 2) is output, M changes its mind to p(e, 1) iff it sees an input not contained in Lne . It follows that M
learns L. This completes the proof of Claim 14 and Theorem 12. 
5. Consistent and monotonic iterative learning
Forbidding U-shapes is a semantic constraint on a learner’s sequence of conjectures. In this section, we study
the interplay of this constraint with consistent and monotonic learning, in a memory-limited setting of iterative
learning.
We now describe and then formally deﬁne the relevant variants of semantic constraints on the sequence of
conjectures. Ba¯rzdin¸š [3] introduced consistent learning (in the context of function learning) where it is essentially
required that the learner’s conjectures do not contradict known data. Jantke [20] introduced strongly monotonic
learning which requires that every set generated by any new conjecture is a superset of the set generated by the
previous one. Wiehagen [39] introduced the less-restrictive requirement of monotonic learning where, for each
language L the learner actually learns, the intersection of Lwith the language generated by a learner’s conjecture
is a superset of the intersection of L with the language generated by any of the learner’s previous conjectures.
Deﬁnition 15. [3,20,39] A learnerM is consistent on a classL iff for all L ∈ L and all  with content() ⊆ L,M()
is deﬁned and content() ⊆ WM(). Cons denotes the collection of all classes which have an Ex-learner which
is consistent on the class of all sets. ClassCons denotes the collection of all classes L which have an Ex-learner
which is consistent on L.
A learnerM is stronglymonotonic iff for all  ⊆ ,WM() ⊆ WM(). SMon denotes the collection of all classes
having a strongly monotonic Ex-learner.
A learnerM forL ismonotonic iff for allL ∈ L, for all texts T forL, for allm < n,L ∩ WM(T [m]) ⊆ L ∩ WM(T [n]).
Mon denotes the collection of all classes having a monotonic Ex-learner.
Note that there are classes L ∈ ClassCons such that only partial learners witness this fact [21,40,41]. Criteria
can be combined. For example, ItCons is the criterion consisting of all classes which have an iterative and
consistent learner.
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It follows fromdeﬁnition of strongmonotonicity that any stronglymonotonic learner is non-U-shaped. Thus,
any class in ItSMon has a strongly monotonic, non-U-shaped iterative learner. It is open at present whether
we can obtain a similar result for monotonic learning. Below we show that similar results can be obtained for
consistent learning too.
Theorem 16. ItCons = ItCons SMon .
Proof. It sufﬁces to show that ItCons ⊆ ItCons SMon . Given an iterative consistent learner M for L, let—as in
the case of normal learners—M() denote the hypothesis whichM makes after having seen the sequence . Now
deﬁne a recursive, one–one, function f such that, for every index e,Wf(e) =⋃∈{′:M(′)=e} content(). Since M
is consistent, content() ⊆ WM() for all ; thus Wf(e) ⊆ We. The new learner N is the modiﬁcation of M which
outputs f(e) instead of e; N is consistent, since whenever N outputs f(e) on , M outputs e on  and thus
content() ⊆ Wf(e). Since f is one–one, N is also iterative and follows the update rule N (f(e), x) = f(M(e, x)).
It is easy to see that N is strongly monotonic: assume that M(e, y) = e′ and x is any element of Wf(e). Then
there is a  with M() = e and x ∈ content(). It follows that M(y) = e′, x ∈ content(y) and x ∈ Wf(e′). So,
Wf(e) ⊆ Wf(e′) and the transitiveness of the inclusion gives the strong monotonicity of N .
It remains to show that N learns L. Let L ∈ L and T be a text for L and e be the index to which M converges
on T . The learner N converges on T to f(e). Since We = L it holds that Wf(e) ⊆ L. Furthermore, for every n,
there exists an m > n with M(T [m]) = e, thus T(n) ∈ Wf(e) and L ⊆ Wf(e). 
Corollary 17. If L ∈ ItCons , then L has a strongly monotonic, consistent and non-U-shaped iterative learner.
It can also be shown that Cons SMon = ItCons SMon . Thus, a class learnable by a consistent and strongly
monotonic learner can be learned by a consistent, strongly monotonic and and non-U-shaped iterative learner.
Note that access to oracle for halting problem allows one to easily check consistency. Thus, any class learnable
by a strongly monotonic learner can also be learnt by a consistent, strongly monotonic and non-U-shaped
iterative learner, when provided with an oracle for the halting problem.
Note that the proof of Theorem 16 needs that the learner is an ItCons -learner and not just an ItClassCons -
learner. In the latter case, the inference process cannot be enforced to be strongly monotonic as the following
example shows.
Example 18. Let E = {0, 2, 4, . . .}. Let Ln = {0, 2, . . . , 2n} ∪ {2n+ 1}. Let L = {E} ∪ {Li : i ∈ }. Then, L is in
ItClassCons –SMon . Thus, ItClassCons ⊆ ItCons .
Proof.On one hand, the learner which conjectures E until an element of the form 2n+ 1 is seen, and then changes
its hypothesis to Ln is easily seen to be class-consistent and iterative. So L ∈ ItClassCons .
On the other hand, a given learner for L has eventually to conjecture an index for E after having seen enough
even numbers. Let n be larger than any number seen by the learner before the conjecture is made as above. Then,
the input text might actually be for the language Ln: in which case the learner would be forced to change its
mind non-strong monotonically. Hence, L /∈ SMon . 
So, class-consistent iterative learners cannot be simulated by strongly monotonic learners. However, the next
result shows that they can still be simulated by monotonic, and, simultaneously, non-U-shaped learners.
Theorem 19. If L ∈ ItClassCons , then L has a monotonic, class consistent, and non-U-shaped iterative learner.
Proof. Suppose M ItClassCons -identiﬁes L. We write M(x1, x2, . . . , xr) for the hypothesis obtained by feed-
ing x1, x2, . . . , xr one after the other into the learner; this notion has the initial hypothesis for r = 0. We say
(x1, x2, . . . , xr) (here r may be 0) is valid if for all i < r (including i = 0), M(x1, . . . , xi)↓ /= M(x1, . . . , xi , xi+1)↓ .
By s-m-n theorem [32], there exists a recursive, one–one function F such that, for valid (x1, x2, . . . , xr) and k  r,
WF(k ,x1,x2,...,xr) = {xi : 1  i  k} ∪ {x : (∃s  k)[M(x1, . . . , xs, x)↓= M(x1, . . . , xs)↓
and (∀w : s  w  r)[x ∈ WM(x1,...,xw)]]}.
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The next two claims follow immediately from the deﬁnition of F .
Claim 20. Suppose (x1, . . . , xr+1) is valid and k  r. Then, WF(k ,x1,x2,...,xr) ⊇ WF(k ,x1,x2,...,xr ,xr+1).
Claim 21. Suppose (x1, . . . , xr) is valid and k  k ′  r. Then, WF(k ,x1,...,xr) ⊆ WF(k ′,x1,...,xr).
Claim 22. Suppose (x1, . . . , xr+1) is valid and k  r. Further suppose {x1, . . . , xr+1} ⊆ L and L ∈ L. Then,
(a)WF(k ,x1,...,xr) ⊆ WM(x1,...,xr);
(b)WF(k ,x1,...,xr) ∩ L ⊆ WM(x1,...,xr ,xr+1);
(c)WF(k ,x1,...,xr) ∩ L ⊆ WF(k ,x1,...,xr ,xr+1).
Statement (a) follows from deﬁnition of F and consistency of M on L. For (b), note that for any
x ∈ WF(k ,x1,...,xr) ∩ L, either (i) x ∈ {x1, x2, . . . , xk} ⊆ WM(x1,...,xr ,xr+1) (by consistency of M on L) or (ii) for some
s  k ,M(x1, . . . , xs, x)↓= M(x1, . . . , xs)↓ (by deﬁnition ofWF(k ,x1,...,xr)), and thusM(x1, . . . , xs, x, xs+1, . . . , xr+1)↓
= M(x1, . . . , xs, xs+1, . . . , xr+1)↓ , as M is iterative; it follows that x ∈ WM(x1,...,xr ,xr+1) (by consistency of M on L).
(c) follows from (b) and the deﬁnition of F .
Claim 23. Suppose (x1, . . . , xr′) is valid and k  k ′, k  r, k ′  r′ and r  r′. Further suppose {x1, . . . , xr′ } ⊆ L and
L ∈ L. Then, WF(k ,x1,...,xr) ∩ L ⊆ WF(k ′,x1,...,xr′ ).
To see this, note thatWF(k ,x1,...,xr) ∩ L ⊆ WF(k ,x1,...,xr′ ), follows fromClaim 22 (c) andWF(k ,x1,...,xr′ ) ⊆ WF(k ′,x1,...,xr′ ),
follows from Claim 21. Thus the Claim follows.
Now we continue with the proof of the theorem and deﬁne N as follows. Note that M is deﬁned on all input
segments for L ∈ L. Suppose, on the input text seen so far, M has made mind changes at the points when it gets
x1, . . . , xr , and k is the smallest number such that, for all x seen in the input so far, there exists an s  k , such that
x = xs or M(x1, . . . , xs) = M(x1, . . . , xs, x) (note that, by induction, such a k can be iteratively found and will be
 r; also note that M(x1, . . . , xs)↓ and M(x1, . . . , xs, x)↓ , for inputs from L ∈ L and thus such minimal k can
be found algorithmically for inputs for L ∈ L). Then, N outputs F(k , x1, . . . , xr).
Claim 23 implies N is monotonic for the class L.
Now consider any text T for L ∈ L. N converges on T as M converges on T . Suppose N on T converges to
F(k , x1, . . . , xr). Then, by Claim 22(a) and L ∈ Ex(M), we immediately have that WF(k ,x1,...,xr) ⊆ L. Furthermore,
as M is iterative and consistent on L, and for every x ∈ content(T), there exists an s  k such that x = xs or
M(x1, . . . , xs, x)↓= M(x1, . . . , xs)↓ , we have L ⊆ WF(k ,x1,...,xr), by deﬁnition of F . Thus,N Ex-learns L in the limit.
To see thatN is consistentonL ∈ L, consider any textT forL, and supposeN (T [m])outputsF(k , x1, x2, . . . , xr).
Consider any x ∈ content(T [m]). BydeﬁnitionofN , there exists an s  k such that either x = xs orM(x1, . . . , xs, x)↓
= M(x1, . . . , xs)↓ . Thus, by iterativeness and consistency of M on L we have that, x ∈ WM(x1,...,xt), for s  t  r.
It follows that x ∈ WF(k ,x1,x2,...,xr).
To see that N is non-U-shaped, consider any L ∈ L and a text T for L. Suppose, N (T [n]) = F(k , x1, . . . , xr)
and WF(k ,x1,...,xr) = L. This implies, by the deﬁnition of F , that, for all x ∈ L, either x equals x1, . . . , xk or
there exists an s  k such that M(x1, . . . , xs) = M(x1, . . . , xs, x). It follows by deﬁnition of N that, for m  n,
N (T [m]) only outputs grammars of form F(k , x1, . . . , xr , . . . , xr′). But then Claim 20 and Claim 22(c) imply that
F(k , x1, . . . , xr , . . . , xr′) is also a grammar for L. 
6. Memoryless feedback learning
An iterative learner has a severe memory limitation: it can store no previously seen data. On the other hand,
crucially, an iterative learner remembers its previous conjecture. In this section, we introduce amodel of learning
in which the learner does not remember its last conjecture and can store no previous input data. The learner is
instead allowed to make, at each stage of its learning process, n feedback queries asking whether some n data
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items have been previously seen. We call such learners n-memoryless feedback learners, and the main result of
the present section, Theorem 30, shows that U-shaped behaviour is necessary for the full learning power of
n-memoryless feedback learning. At the end of the present section, in Theorem 32 we prove that, as might be
expected, being able to do n+ 1 feedback queries gives more learning power than being able to do only n.
We now proceed with the formal deﬁnition of n-memoryless feedback learning.
Deﬁnition 24. Suppose n  0. An n-memoryless feedback learner M has as input one datum from a text. It can
then make n-queries which are calculated from its input datum. These queries are as to whether these n data
items were already seen previously in the text. From its input and the answers to these queries, it either outputs
a hypothesis or the ? symbol. That is, given a language L and a text T for L, M determines its hypothesis ek
on input T(k) as follows: First, n-values qi(T(k)), i = 1, . . . , n, are computed. Second, n bits bi , i = 1, . . . , n are
determined and passed on to M , where bi is 1 if qi(T(k)) ∈ content(T [k]) and 0 otherwise. Third, a hypothesis
ek is computed from T(k) and the bi’s. M MLFn-learns L iff, for all texts T for L, for ek deﬁned as above, there
is a k such that Wek = L and em ∈ {?, ek} for all m > k . M MLFn-learns L iff it MLFn-learns each L ∈ L. MLFn
denotes the collection of all classes learnable by an n-memoryless feedback learner.
In what follows Di is the ﬁnite set with canonical index i [32]: i algorithmically codes both the cardinality of
Di and how to decide membership in Di .
Remark 25.One can generalizeMLFn toMLF∗. EachMLF∗-learner employs a recursive function F mapping
to ﬁnite subsets of  such that, for every x, the learner asks whether any of the y ∈ DF(x) have been seen before.
Depending on the answers, the learner outputs a hypothesis or ?. Clearly, by Theorem 32, MLF∗ is a proper
superset of MLFn.
On one hand, It ⊆ MLF∗ since the class of all sets {0, x} and {1, x} with x ∈ {2, 3, 4, . . .} is not learnable by
an MLF∗ learner. For y = 0 or 1, if the learner makes a conjecture on input y , where all the questions are
answered ‘no’, then it is wrong on input xy∞ for some x ∈ DF(y). On the other hand, if the learner does not make
a conjecture on both the inputs 0 and 1 where all questions are answered ‘no’, then it clearly does not identify
one of the sets {0, x} or {1, x} for some x /∈ DF(0) ∪ DF(1).
On the other hand, let E = {2x : x ∈ }, Ap = E ∪ {pi : i ∈ } and Bp = E ∪ {pi : i ∈ } − {2p}. Then, L =
{E} ∪ {Ap : p is an odd prime} ∪ {Bp : p is an odd prime} is not iteratively learnable. But one can verify that it
is in MLF1: let x be the input; if x ∈ E and 1 has not been seen so far (as veriﬁed by a query), then the learner
conjectures E; if x = pi , for some odd prime p and i ∈ , and 2p has been seen so far, then the learner conjectures
Ap ; if x = pi , for some odd prime p and i ∈ , and 2p has not been seen so far, then the learner conjectures Bp ;
in all other cases the learner abstains from a new conjecture.
The next result shows that non-U-shaped 1-memoryless feedback learners are strictly less powerful than
unrestricted 1-memoryless feedback learners: There exists a class of languages that can be learned by a 1-
memoryless feedback learner only if the learner is allowed to make some U-shapes on some text for some
language in the class. The basic idea for the proof is to include in the class two types of sets that start differing
after a non-computable point. After this proof we indicate how to adapt it to show that U-shaped learning is
necessary at each level of the MLFn-hierarchy (see Theorem 30 below).
Theorem 26. NUShMLF1 ⊂ MLF1.
Proof. The idea is to use, for every e, two sets Le,He such that the learner can easily ﬁgure out that it has to learn
one of these sets, but is nevertheless forced to oscillate between these two hypotheses and is therefore U-shaped.
These two sets are equal up to some value F(e), where
F(e) = max({1 + ϕi(e) : i  e and ϕi(e)↓ } ∪ {0}).
Note that F grows faster than any partial or total recursive function. Based on this function F one now
deﬁnes the family L = {L0,L1,L2, . . .} ∪ {H0,H1,H2, . . .} where
Le = {〈e, x〉 : x < F(e) or x is even};
He = {〈e, x〉 : x < F(e) or x is odd}.
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We ﬁrst show that L ∈ MLF1. Note that the learning algorithm cannot store the last guess due to its memory
limitation, but might output a ‘?’ in order to repeat that hypothesis. The parameter e is visible from each current
input except ‘#’. The algorithm is the following.
If the new input is # or if the input is 〈e, x〉 and the feedback says that 〈e, x + 1〉 has already appeared in the
input earlier, then output ?. Otherwise, if input is 〈e, x〉 and 〈e, x + 1〉 has not yet appeared in input, then output
a canonical grammar for Le (He) if x is even (odd).
Consider any text T for Le. Let n be such that content(T [n]) ⊇ Le ∩ {〈e, x〉 : x  F(e)+ 1}. Then, it is easy to
verify that, the learner will either output ? or a conjecture for Le beyond T [n]. On the other hand, for any even
x > F(e), if T(m) = 〈e, x〉, then the learner outputs a conjecture for Le after having seen T [m+ 1] (this happens
inﬁnitely often, by deﬁnition of Le). Thus, the learner MLF1-identiﬁes Le. Similar argument applies for He.
We now show that L ∈ NUShMLF1. So suppose by way of contradiction that the learner M NUShMLF1-
identiﬁes L. We now do the following analysis.
We assume, without loss of generality, that M ’s query on input 〈e, x〉 is of the form 〈e, x′〉 for some x′. If
M(〈e, x〉) makes the query 〈e, x′〉, then we let Q(〈e, x〉) = x′.
Claim 27.
(a) There do not exist inﬁnitely many e such that, for some x, M(〈e, x〉) outputs a hypothesis on ‘yes’ answer to
feedback query.
(b) There do not exist inﬁnitely many e such that, for some x, M(〈e, x〉) does not pose a query, but outputs a
hypothesis.
Of this claim, we show part (a). Part (b) can be shown similarly. Suppose by way of contradiction otherwise.
Deﬁne partial function 	 to be 	(e) = max({xe,Q(〈e, xe〉)}), where xe is the ﬁrst number found, if any, such that
M(〈e, xe〉) on answer ‘yes’ to query, outputs a hypothesis. Now F(e) > 	(e) (if 	(e) is deﬁned), for all but ﬁnitely
many e. Thus, we have that, for inﬁnitely many e, xe < F(e),Q(〈e, x〉) < F(e), and on answer ‘yes’, M(〈e, xe〉)
outputs a hypothesis. Pick any such e. Without loss of generality assume that M(〈e, xe〉) is not a grammar for Le
(case ofHe is similar). Consider the text T for Le which starts with 〈e,Q(〈e, xe〉)〉 and has 〈e, xe〉 in every alternate
position of the input. Now M on T inﬁnitely often outputs a hypothesis which is not for Le (whenever it sees
〈e, xe〉 in the input), and thus M does not Ex-identify Le. This completes the proof of the claim.
Nowwe continuewith the proof of the theorem.As ﬁnitelymanyLe/He can easily be learned, for the following
analysis, wemay assumewithout loss of generality that, for any input,M outputs a hypothesis onlywhenmaking
a query and getting a ‘no’-answer. We further assume, without loss of generality, that, if M does not output a
hypothesis on a ‘no’-answer, then it does not make the query at all (since the query in this case is not used).
Thus, all and only the ‘no’-answer queries lead to hypothesis output by M .
Claim 28. For any e, if {〈e, x〉, 〈e, x′〉} ⊆ Le, and M(〈e, x〉) on a ‘no’-answer to query, outputs a grammar for Le,
and M(〈e, x′〉) on a ‘no’-answer to query, outputs a grammar which is not for Le, then Q(〈e, x′〉) = x. Similar result
holds when Le above is replaced by He.
For a proof of this claim, assume that it does not hold for some e, x, x′, and consider a text T for Le starting
with 〈e, x〉〈e, x′〉. Then, M is non-U-shaped on T .
Claim 29.
(a)There exist only ﬁnitely many e such that card({Q(〈e, x〉) : x ∈ })  3.
(b)There exist only ﬁnitely many e such that card({Q(〈e, x〉) : x ∈ }) = 1.
(c) There exist only ﬁnitely many e such that card({Q(〈e, x〉) : x ∈ }) = 2.
The main result is now obtained by proving this claim.
(a) Suppose by way of contradiction otherwise. Let 	 be a partial function such that, 	(e) = max({xe1 , xe2, xe3}),




3 are the ﬁrst three numbers found, in some standard search, such that Q(〈e, xe1 〉), Q(〈e, xe2〉)
L. Carlucci et al. / Information and Computation 205 (2007) 1551–1573 1565
andQ(〈e, xe3〉), are all different (if there are no such xe1 , xe2, xe3, then 	(e) is undeﬁned). Now by deﬁnition of F ,
for all but ﬁnitely many e, F(e) > 	(e), if it is deﬁned. Pick any e in domain of 	 such that F(e) > 	(e). Note
that 〈e, xe1 〉, 〈e, xe2〉, 〈e, xe3〉 are in both Le and He. Let xeL, xeH be such that 〈e, xeL〉 ∈ Le and 〈e, xeH 〉 ∈ He and
M(〈e, xeL〉) outputs a grammar for Le on answer ‘no’ to query and M(〈e, xeH 〉) outputs a grammar for He
on answer ‘no’ to query (note that there exist such xeL, x
e
H , since otherwise M does not Ex-identify Le,He).
Let xej , j ∈ {1, 2, 3} be such that Q(〈e, xej 〉) ∈ {xeL, xeH }. Without loss of generality, suppose that M(〈e, xej 〉) is
not a grammar for Le (case of He is similar). Then, on any text T for Le starting with 〈e, xeL〉〈e, xej 〉, M is
U-shaped.
(b) Suppose by way of contradiction otherwise. Let 	 be a partial function such that 	(e) = Q(〈e, x〉), for the
ﬁrst x found such thatM(〈e, x〉) asks a query (and outputs a hypothesis on ‘no’-answer). Pick an e such that
card({Q(〈e, x〉) : x ∈ }) = 1 and 	(e)↓< F(e) (all but ﬁnitely many e such that card({Q(〈e, x〉) : x ∈ }) =
1, satisfy this condition). Let qe be the only member of {Q(〈e, x〉) : x ∈ }. Note that qe belongs to both Le
and He. But then, for any text for Le or He which starts with qe, M does not make any further hypothesis
beyond T [1]. Thus, M cannot Ex-identify both Le and He.
(c) Similar to part (b), by using 	 to bound the two potential queries, and starting the text with both these
queries. This completes the proof of the claim.
Now, parts (a)–(c) of Claim 29 immediately lead to a contradiction. 
It is not difﬁcult to see that the proof of Theorem 26 can be adapted to show there is a class in MLFn that
is not MLFn-learnable without U-shapes. This can be achieved by adding all possible subsets of n− 1 special
elements, s1, s2, . . . , sn−1, to the languages used in Theorem 26. Then, the machine from the proof of the positive
part of Theorem 26 can be modiﬁed as follows. If it sees these special elements, the learner outputs ?. If the
learner sees any other element x, then the learner queries whether s1, . . . , sn−1 are in the input besides the main
query and outputs conjectures as before, with the special elements answered ‘yes’ being added to the conjecture.
The negative direction of the proof can proceed essentially as before, as the last conjectures of the learner needs
to correctly determine whether the special elements are in the input or not. We omit the details. This gives us
the following Theorem showing that U-shaped learning is necessary for full learning power of n-memoryless
feedback learners, for all n > 0. For n = 0, NUShMLF0 = MLF0, see Remark 38 in Section 7.
Theorem 30. For all n > 0, NUShMLFn ⊂ MLFn.
It is reasonable to ask, as we do in the Conclusion (Section 8), whether the need for U-shaped learning in
Theorem 26 can be removed by allowing more queries. That is, can we show that there are MLF1-learnable
classes that, for all n > 1, are not MLFn-learnable withoutU-shapes. The class from Theorem 26 is perhaps such
an example, although it is NUShMLF∗-learnable.
Finally, an iterative total learner that can store one selected previous datum is called a Bem1-learner (1-
bounded example memory learner) in [11,30]. One can also consider a “memoryless” version of this concept,
where a learner does notmemorize its previous hypothesis, but, instead, memorizes one selected previous datum.
Under both these criteria, the class {{0, x}, {1, x} : x > 1} from Remark 25 is non-U-shapedly learnable with the
corresponding memory bound; indeed it would even be ﬁnitely learnable if one allows memorization of data,
without outputting a hypothesis. But this class is not in MLF∗ as mentioned above. So we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 31. NUShBem1 ⊆ MLF∗.
To conclude this section, we show that the n-memoryless feedback criteria form a hierarchy of more and
more powerful learning criteria increasing in the number n of feedback queries allowed.
Theorem 32. For all n > 0, NUShMLFn+1 ⊆ MLFn.
Proof. Fix an algorithmic enumeration M0,M1, . . . of learners [18]. We diagonalize against this enumeration.
Let Li = {〈0, x〉 : x  n} ∪ {〈i + 1, x〉 : x ∈ }. Let LSi = S ∪ {〈i + 1, 2x〉 : x ∈ }. L will contain Li , and maybe LSii ,
for some i, where Si is deﬁned just below.
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Si is deﬁned as follows (using some standard search): search for y ∈ Li − {〈0, x〉 : x ∈ } such that Mi(y)
queries q1, ..., qn and outputs a grammar which contains at least n+ 2 elements outside {〈i + 1, 2x〉 : x ∈ },
where the answers given to q1, . . . , qn are ‘yes’ if and only if they belong to Li . Then, Si = {y , q1, . . . , qn} ∩ Li ,
where Si is deﬁned based on the ﬁrst success found in the above search in some standard method of searching.
Claim: L is not in MLFn. Suppose by way of contradiction that some learner MLFn-learns L. Take i so large
that Mi is equivalent to the given learner and Li is not among the sets conjectured by the learner on any  with
content() ⊆ {〈0, x〉 : x  n} and ||  n+ 1.




Claim: L is in NUShMLFn+1. On inputs of form 〈i + 1, 2x〉 query elements 〈0, x〉 such that x  n. If all are
present, then conjecture Li . Otherwise search for Si as above for x steps. If found, then conjecture, L
Si
i . Otherwise
conjecture ?. It is easy to verify the claim. 
7. Bounded memory states learning
Memoryless feedback learners store no information about the past. Bounded memory states learners, in-
troduced in this section, have no memory of previous conjectures but can store a bounded number of values
in their long term memory. This model allows one to separate the issue of a learner’s ability to remember its
previous conjecture from the issue of a learner’s ability to store information about the previously seen input.
Similar models of machines with bounded long term memory are studied in [22]. We now proceed with the
formal deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 33. [22] For c > 0, a c-bounded memory states learner is a (possibly partial) function
M : {0, 1, . . . , c − 1} × ( ∪ {#}) → ( ∪ {?})× {0, 1, . . . , c − 1}
which maps the old long term memory content plus a datum to the current hypothesis plus the new long term
memory content. The long term memory has the initial value 0. There is no initial hypothesis.
M learns a classL iff, for every L ∈ L and every text T for L, there is a sequence a0, a1, . . . of long termmemory
contents and e0, e1, . . . of hypotheses and a number n such that, for all m, a0 = 0, Wen = L, M(am, T(m)) =
(em, am+1) and m  n ⇒ em ∈ {?, en}. We denote by BMSc the collection of classes learnable by a c-bounded
memory states learner.
The next result shows that, for bounded memory states learning, the concepts of explanatory and be-
haviourally correct learning essentially coincide. Below n! denotes 1 ∗ 2 ∗ . . . ∗ (n− 1) ∗ n.
Theorem 34. If M has a constant bound c > 0 on its long term memory and identiﬁes a class L in behaviourally
correct way, then there is a further learner with memory bound (c + 1)! which identiﬁes L with at most 2c mind
changes.
Proof. The proof follows ideas outlined in [22]. The idea is to build a new learner N which simulates M on a
modiﬁed input text, with certain old data-items (virtually) inserted in the text, in order to undo certain changes
of state or hypotheses. The learner N cannot remember these data-items explicitly, but can determine, whether
it should copy a hypothesis of M or replace it by the symbol ?, and whether it should go into a new state or not.
In order to do this, the long term memory of N stores the following pieces of information:
• A sequence q1, q2, . . . , qn of long term memory contents visited so far by M on the modiﬁed text (with the
virtual insertions). These memory contents are stored in the order of the ﬁrst time M has such memory
contents, when it gets as input the modiﬁed input text.
• The index n of the last memory value qn.
• The largest index m such that, N had output some hypothesis on a datum, when it had memory con-
tent (q1, q2, . . . , qm) as in the ﬁrst item above (here memory content may or may not have changed to
(q1, q2, . . . , qm, qm+1) after the output); m = 0 if N has not output any hypothesis.
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We will have the invariant that, at any stage of the above simulation, the last conjecture output by N on the
text seen so far would be the same as the last conjecture output by M on the modiﬁed text seen so far (the
actual text seen so far plus the virtual insertions made on this portion). Thus, (i) for k  m, there exists a portion
of this modiﬁed text which takes M from memory content qk to qn, with the last conjecture of M on this
segment being the same as the current last conjecture of N, and (ii) for m < k  n, there exists a portion of
this modiﬁed text which takes M from memory content qk to qn, without making any conjecture (i.e., by only
outputting ?).
Note that n can take values from 1 to c, m can take values from 0 to c and that the sequence q1, q2, . . . , qn
is the initial part of some permutation of the c elements in the set {0, 1, . . . , c − 1}. So one can extend this to a
full permutation by assigning arbitrary values to the remaining elements. Furthermore, q1 = 0 and qk > 0 for
k > 1, thus there are (c − 1)! many possible values for the sequence q1, q2, . . . , qn. In addition one has c many
possible values for n and c + 1 many possible values for m, giving in total (c + 1)! possible values for the long
term memory.
Now the new learner N starts with the long term memory content such that n = 1, q1 = 0,m = 0. The update
rule is the following for a data-item x, where e ∈  (that is, e /= ?) in the case distinction:
(1) if M(qn, x)=(?, r) for some r ∈ {q1, . . . , qn}, then N does not change its long term memory and
conjectures ?;
(2) if M(qn, x) = (?, r) for some r /∈ {q1, . . . , qn}, then N deﬁnes qn+1 = r, updates n = n+ 1 and conjectures ?;
(3) ifM(qn, x)=(e, qk) for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, thenN does not change its long termmemory and conjectures ?;
(4) if M(qn, x) = (e, qk) for some k ∈ {m+ 1, . . . , n}, then N updates m = n and conjectures e;
(5) if M(qn, x) = (e, r) for some r /∈ {q1, . . . , qn}, then N deﬁnes qn+1 = r, updates m = n, updates n = n+ 1
and conjectures e.
For the veriﬁcation, let a language L ∈ L and a text T for L be given. The underlying idea is the following: in
Cases (1), (3) and (4), the learnerN “virtually inserts” data in the text so that the simulatedmachineM has, after
seeing the real datum x and the virtual data, the long term memory qn; no virtual insertions takes place in Cases
(2) and (5). Moreover, the last conjecture output by N on the text seen so far is the same as the last conjecture
output by M on the modiﬁed text seen so far. This allows N to continue the simulation of M . In Case (1), the
virtual data inserted after x consists of the text segment which took M from memory r to qn, such that only ?
are output by M on this virtual data, or the last hypothesis e′ of N shows up as the last hypothesis generated
by M on this sequence. In Case (3), the virtual data inserted after x consists of the text segment which took M
from memory qk to memory qn, where the last conjecture of M on this segment is the same as the current last
conjecture of N . Thus, again this virtual data insertion allows N to continue with the simulation as in Case
(3). In Case (4), the virtual data inserted is the text segment which takes M from memory content qk to qn. N
copies the hypothesis e as it would overwrite the last hypothesis e′ of N . For Cases (2) and (5), no virtual data
needs to be inserted. The remaining part of the veriﬁcation is that the ideas of virtually inserting data would
transform a given text T to a text T ′ such that, eitherM does not make a hypothesis on T ′ at all (i.e., only outputs
no-conjecture-symbols), or that M outputs ﬁnitely many hypotheses with the last one being the same as the last
hypothesis of N or that M outputs inﬁnitely many hypotheses with the last one of N occurring inﬁnitely often
in the sequence. Since M has also to learn L from T ′, one can conclude that N outputs some hypotheses and
that its last hypothesis e is correct since it is either also the last hypothesis of M on T ′ or M outputs e inﬁnitely
often on T ′.
To see the mind change bound, one has only to look at how many hypotheses are output while n has a ﬁxed
value k . These are at most two hypotheses, at the ﬁrst,m is updated from some value below k to k , at the second,
a new element is added to the list and n is updated from k to k + 1. This completes the proof. 
We now state and prove the main result of the present section, showing that every 2-bounded memory states
learner can be simulated by a non-U-shaped one. Note that NUShBMS1 = BMS1 by Remark 38 below in this
section.
Theorem 35. BMS2 = NUShBMS2.
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Proof. It sufﬁces to show thatBMS2 ⊆ NUShBMS2. LetLbe given and assume thatM witnessesL ∈ BMS2.We
assume, without loss of generality, that M does not change its memory on input #, as otherwise we could easily
modify M to work without any memory. We will construct a learner N below which NUShBMS2-identiﬁes L.
Intuitive idea of the proof is as follows. To maintain non-U-shapedness, the learner N will not change its
memory from 1 to 0. Furthermore, before having memory 1, if ever, N would output a modiﬁcation P(e) of the
conjecture of M ; after achieving memory 1, N will just output as M does. Note that if no element of the input
language L causes M to change its memory from 0 to 1, or if there is a member of L which causes M to change
its memory from 1 to 0, then one can assume that M outputs only one grammar on the input text (otherwise,
it is easy to construct a text on which M does not converge to a single grammar). Thus, in this case we just
need to ensure that P(e) enumerates the same language as e does. (The above is handled as Case 1 and Case 2
in the proof below.) Otherwise, we have that M never changes its memory back from 1 to 0. Furthermore, all
the grammars output by M , after it has achieved memory 1, must be correct grammars. We then consider cases,
based on whether (i) there exists an x ∈ L such that x causes memory of M to change from 0 to 1, and if x is
received as input when M has memory 1, then M outputs a conjecture or (ii) there does not exist a x ∈ L which
causes M to change its memory from 0 to 1 without outputting a conjecture. If (i) above holds, then we make
sure that P(e) does not enumerate the input language L, and at the point when x is received as input, N outputs
the conjecture which M outputs when it receives x and had memory 1 (this conjecture must be correct). This
is handled as Case 3. If (i) does not hold, but (ii) holds, then we again make sure that P(e) does not enumerate
the input language, and N follows M from the point of conversion of memory from 0 to 1 (and thus would
identify the input language, asM does; it does not make any U-shapes as, beyond the memory change from 0 to
1, all conjectures are correct). This is handled as Case 4 below. If neither of (i) or (ii) holds, then we do a slightly
intricate analysis based on whether there are ﬁnitely or inﬁnitely many elements which cause M to output a
conjecture when it has memory 1. This is handled as Case 5. The deﬁnition of P(e) is to ensure that, based on
above cases, P(e) either follows e or becomes a ﬁnite subset of it. In the deﬁnition of P(e) below, S(e) just tries
to ﬁnd the time steps upto which it is safe to simulate We. We now proceed formally.
In the following, “∗” stands for the case that the value does not matter and in all (legal) cases the same is
done.
Deﬁne a function P such that P(?) =? and, for e ∈ , P(e) is an index of the setWP(e) =⋃s∈S(e) We,s where S(e)
is the set of all s satisfying either (a) or ((b) and (c) and (d)) below:
(a) There exists an x ∈ We,s, M(1, x) = (∗, 0).
(b) For all x ∈ We,s, [M(0, x) = (∗, 1) ⇒ M(1, x) = (?, 1)].
(c) There exists an x ∈ We,s, M(0, x) = (?, 1) or for all x ∈ We,s, M(0, x) = (∗, 0).
(d) For all x ∈ We,s ∪ {#}, [M(0, x) = (j, ∗) ⇒ We,s ⊆ Wj ∧ Wj,s ⊆ We].




(P(j), 0), if m = 0 and M(0, x) = (j, 0);
(j, 1), if m = 0 and M(0, x) = (∗, 1) and M(1, x) = (j, ∗)
and j /=?;
(j, 1), if m = 0 and M(0, x) = (j, 1) and M(1, x) = (?, ∗);
(j, 1), if m = 1 and M(1, x) = (j, ∗).
Now ﬁx an L ∈ L and a text T for L. Note that M identiﬁes L. We show below that N will also identify L
from text T .
Case (1): For all x ∈ L, M(0, x) = (∗, 0).
Then N behaves exactly like M with the only difference that every hypothesis e is translated to P(e). As M
converges syntactically to a hypothesis e, N converges syntactically to the hypothesis P(e). One can now verify
that every s goes into S(e) by satisfying the conditions (b), (c) and (d) and thusWP(e) = We: (b) and (c) are clearly
satisﬁed; for condition (d) note that all hypotheses output by M are e since otherwise M would diverge on fat
texts for L, that is, on texts where every datum of L ∪ {#} appears inﬁnitely often.
Case (2): Not Case (1) and there exists an x ∈ L, M(1, x) = (∗, 0).
L. Carlucci et al. / Information and Computation 205 (2007) 1551–1573 1569
First, we show that the learner N outputs at least one conjecture on T . Assume by way of contradiction that
N on text T does not output any hypothesis. We then show that there is a text T ′ for L on which M does not
output any hypothesis. Let m be the ﬁrst number such that after seeing T [m], M has memory 1. Then N and
M both do not output any hypothesis on this initial portion T [m]. T ′ will be a modiﬁcation of T by inserting
appropriate elements in order to force M back to memory 1 without outputting a hypothesis. Let T ′ be the
limit of n deﬁned as follows. One starts with 0 = T [m] and now deﬁnes n+1 inductively from n: if M after
nT(m+ n) has the memory 1, then we set n+1 = nT(m+ n); else we set n+1 = nT(m+ n)T [m] in order to
transfer M back into memory 1 without outputting a conjecture. Now T ′ =⋃n∈ n and M does not output
any hypothesis on T ′. However, T ′ is just T with T [m] inserted at some places, and therefore T ′ is a text for L.
Hence M does not identify L, a contradiction. So N does output a conjecture on T .
Similarly, we can show that M outputs only one hypothesis e on data coming from L. Otherwise one could
create a text T ′ on which M outputs inﬁnitely often two different hypotheses as follows. Let  be an initial
segment of a text T for L such that M outputs two distinct hypothesis on initial segments of . Let x be an
element of the input language on which M changes its memory from 1 to 0. Let T ′ be deﬁned by inserting  or
y after every T(n), based on whether M has memory value 0 or 1 after receiving T(n). Then, it is easy to verify
that T ′ is a text for L, and M inﬁnitely often outputs two different hypothesis on T ′.
So N makes at most one mind change, potentially from P(e) to e, and thus N is non-U-shaped. For correct-
ness, note that WP(e) = We since (a) holds.
Case (3): Not Cases (1), (2) and there exists an x ∈ L such that M(0, x) = (∗, 1) and M(1, x) /= (?, 1).
In this case, all conjectures of N before getting memory 1 are wrong. This is because, for any e, WP(e)
either contains an x such that M(1, x) = (∗, 0) (due to condition (a)), or it does not contain any x such that
M(0, x) = (∗, 1) and M(1, x) /= (?, 1) (due to condition (b)). Also, once N has memory content 1, it will only
output correct grammars, since M outputs only correct grammars after having memory 1—otherwise M would
output inﬁnitely often wrong grammars on a fat text for L. The output during transition from memory 0 to 1
thus does not effect U-shapedness. N does Ex-identify L, as it will output a correct grammar for L once it sees
the input x.
Furthermore, N converges on T since M converges on T(0)T(0)T(1)T(1)T(2)T(2) . . . which is obviously also
a text for L.
Case (4): Not Cases (1), (2), (3) and for all x ∈ L, M(0, x) /= (?, 1).
In this case, N does change memory, outputs a grammar at the point of changing memory and then follows
M . Thus it Ex-identiﬁes L. We now claim that every grammar output by N before it changes memory to 1 is
incorrect. Suppose by way of contradiction that P(e) output by N before it changes memory to 1 is a grammar
for L. By hypothesis of current case, there is an x ∈ L such that M(0, x) = (∗, 1). Fix one such x. Now, for all s
with We,s ⊆ L, if x ∈ We,s, the conditions (a) and (c) do not hold and s /∈ S(e). Thus, either WP(e) is not a subset of
L or WP(e) does not contain x, a contradiction. Hence N is non-U-shaped.
Case (5): Not Cases (1), (2), (3), (4). That is, the following three conditions hold:
• for all x ∈ L, M(1, x) = (∗, 1);
• for all x ∈ L, if M(0, x) = (∗, 1), then M(1, x) = (?, 1);
• there exists an x ∈ L such that M(0, x) = (?, 1).
Note thatM necessarily outputs correct hypotheses after it achieves memory 1 (since otherwiseM would output
inﬁnitely often wrong grammars on a fat text for L).
Subcase (5—I): L contains only ﬁnitely many elements x such that M(1, x) = (j, 1), j /=?
We ﬁrst claim that for all j /=?, such that M(0, x) = (j, ∗), Wj = L. Suppose otherwise. Let y be such that
M(0, y) outputs a wrong hypothesis. Let X = {x ∈ L : M(1, x) = (j, 1), j /=?}. Note that, for all x ∈ X , we must
haveM(0, x) = (j, 0) for some j ∈  ∪ {?}, by the hypothesis of the current case. Let z ∈ L be such thatM(0, z) =
(?, 1) (there exists such a z by the hypothesis of current case). Let  be such that content() = X . Let T ′′ be a
text for L− X . Now consider the text T ′ = yT ′′ if M(0, y) = (∗, 1); T ′ = yzT ′′ otherwise. Then, M on T ′ never
outputs a conjecture beyond y , and thus it converges on T ′ to a wrong hypothesis for L, a contradiction. It
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follows that M always outputs a correct hypothesis (or ?) on input from L ∪ {#} (for any memory value). Thus,
all hypothesis output byN are also correct (since conditions (b), (c), (d) hold for large enough s, in the deﬁnition
of S(e), for any e such that We = L). Hence, N NUShEx -identiﬁes L.
Subcase (5—II): L contains inﬁnitely many elements x such that M(1, x) = (j, 1), j /=?
In this case N clearly outputs a conjecture after achieving memory 1 and thus N converges on T to the same
hypothesis as M on T . So N Ex-identiﬁes L from T .
Now, if for all x ∈ L ∪ {#},M(∗, x) outputs a correct hypothesis, if any, thenWP(e) = We = L for all hypothesis
e output by M on input x (for any memory value), since conditions (b), (c) and (d) hold for large enough s in
the deﬁnition of S(e). Thus, N only outputs correct hypotheses and N is non-U-shaped.
On the other hand, if there exists an x ∈ L ∪ {#} such thatM(0, x) outputs a wrong hypothesis, then all gram-
mars output byN before changingmemory to 1 are not forL. This holds as for any e: ifWe /= L, thenWP(e) is either
ﬁnite or equal toWe, and hence not equal to L; on the other hand ifWe = L, then in the computation ofWP(e), (a)
does not hold, and (d) canhold only for ﬁnitelymany s, andhenceWP(e) /= L. HenceN is non-U-shapedonL. 
In the just previous proof, the modiﬁcation of We to WP(e) is essential. If this were not be permitted and we
considered class-preserving learners only, the result changes, as the following remark shows.
Remark 36. The proof of Theorem 12 above provides a class L ∈ (Itcp − NUShEx cp), where the superscript cp
stands for class-preserving learning.
This same L is also in BMScp2 as the learner M from the proof of Claim 14 can be modiﬁed to obtain the
machine M ′ witnessing this fact. Recall that
L = {Le : e ∈ } ∪ {Lne : Se /= ∅ ∧ 〈n, t〉 = min(Se)},
where Se was a certain set deﬁned in dependence of the eth learner from an enumeration of all learners. Further-
more, recall that p(e, 0) generates Le and p(e, 2) generates Lne , where p is from the proof of Claim 14. M
′ starts
with long term memory 0 and works on input 〈e, x〉 as follows:
M ′(a, 〈e, x〉) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(p(e, 0), 0), if a = 0 and Se does not contain any 〈n, t〉  x;
(p(e, 2), 1), if a = 0 and Se contains an element 〈n, t〉  x;
(p(e, 0), 1), if a = 1 and min(Se) = 〈n, t〉  x, and 〈e, x〉 /∈ Lne ;
(?, 1), otherwise.
It is easy to verify that M ′ Ex-identiﬁes the class L—employing long term memory {0, 1}.
To conclude the present section we state the following Theorem that the c-bounded memory state cri-
teria form a hierarchy of more and more powerful learning criteria increasing in the number c of states
allowed. Note that 1-bounded memory state learners can identify singleton classes consisting of one set. The
class
Lc = {{0, 1, 2}, {0, 1, 2, 3}, {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, . . . , {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2c}}
from [22, discussion after Theorem 7.6] witnesses the properness of the following inclusion. The discussion there
can be easily extended to show Lc is not in BMSc−1. We give the proof for completeness.
Theorem 37. For all c > 1, BMSc−1 ⊂ BMSc.
Proof. Consider the class
Lc = {{0, 1, 2}, {0, 1, 2, 3}, {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, . . . , {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2c}}
as in [22, Discussion after Theorem 7.6]. In [22] it is shown that this class is learnable with c long term mem-
ory states but not learnable with less than 2c − 2 mind changes. Suppose by way of contradiction that M
BMSc−1-learns Lc. Deﬁne i , for i  2c − 2, such that content(i) = {x : x  i + 2}, and M(i) is a grammar
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for {x : x  i + 2}, and i−1 ⊆ i (where −1 is taken to be ). Let the states of M after receiving i be ai . We
claim that a2j , j  c − 1, must all be pairwise distinct, and hence M uses at least c memory values. If not, then
suppose a2j = a2(j+k), where j + 1  j + k  c − 1. Let  be such that 2j = 2(j+k). Note that  is non-empty,
and M makes at least 2 distinct conjectures between 2j (exclusive) and 2(j+k) (inclusive) (at 2j+1 and 2j+2).
Thus,M on 2j∞ makes inﬁnitely manymind changes, even though content(2j) ∈ Lc. Theorem follows. 
Remark 38.OnecangeneralizeBMSc toClass BMSandBMS. The learners for these criteriausenatural numbers
as long term memory. For Class BMSwe have the additional constraint that, for every text of a language inside
the learnt class, there is a constant c, depending on the text, such that the value of the long termmemory is never
a number larger than c. For BMS the corresponding constraint applies to all texts for all sets, even those outside
the class.
One can extend methods used above for BMSc and results from [22] to prove that Class BMS = It . Further-
more, a class is in BMS iff it has a conﬁdent iterative learner, that is, an iterative learner which converges on
every text, whether this text is for a language in the class to be learned or not.
It is easy to see that
⋃
c∈ BMSc ⊂ BMS ⊂ Class BMS. Furthermore, one has by Remark 25 that there
is a class in MLF1 − Class BMS. The bottom levels of the hierarchies coincide: BMS1 = MLF0. These levels
are nontrivial as they already contain every uniformly recursive class of disjoint non-empty languages; the
disjointness is important, since, for a /= b, an MLF0-learner cannot learn the class of languages {{a}, {b}, {a, b}}.
It is easy to argue that MLF0 = NUShMLF0.
Furthermore, there is a class in BMS2 − MLF∗. To see this let Li = {〈i + 1, x〉 : x ∈ } and Li,x = Li ∪
{〈0, 〈i, x〉〉}. Then, the class {Li : i ∈ } ∪ {Li,x : i, x ∈ } is in BMS2 − MLF∗.
8. Conclusions and open problems
Numerous results related to non-U-shaped learning for machines with severe memory limitations were ob-
tained. In particular, it was shown that
• there are class-preservingly iteratively learnable classes that cannot be learned without U-shapes by any
iterative class-preserving learner (Theorem 12),
• consistent iterative learners for a class can be turned into consistent, iterative, non-U-shaped and strongly
monotonic learners for that class (Corollary 17),
• class-consistent iterative learners for a class canbe turned into iterative non-U-shaped andmonotonic learners
for that class (Theorem 19),
• for all n > 0, there are n-memoryless feedback learnable classes that cannot be learned without U-shapes by
any n-memoryless feedback learner (Theorem 30) and, by contrast,
• every class learnable by a 2-bounded memory states learner can be learned by a 2-bounded memory states
learner without U-shapes (Theorem 35).
The above results are, in our opinion, interesting in that they show how the impact of forbidding U-shaped
learning in the context of severely memory-limited models of learning is far from trivial. In particular, the
tradeoffs that our results reveal between remembering one’s previous conjecture, having a long term memory,
and being able tomake feedback queries are delicate and perhaps surprising.Many fascinating problems remain
open.
FromTheorem 30, we know that, form > 0,NUShMLFm ⊂ MLFm. It would be interesting to knowwhether,
Problem 39. For m > 0, is MLFm ⊆ NUShMLFn, for some n > m?
Finally, for state bounded memory learning, it is open whether our Theorem 35 generalizes to the case of
learners that are allowed to store one among c values for c > 2.
Problem 40. Is BMSc ⊆ NUShBMSc, for c > 2?
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Also, the question of the necessity of U-shaped behaviour with respect to the stronger memory-limited
variants of Ex-learning (bounded example memory and feedback learning) from the previous literature [24,11]
remains wide open. Humans can remember much more than one bit and likely retain something of their prior
hypotheses; furthermore, they have some access to knowledge of whether they have seen something before.
Hence, the open problems of this section may prove interesting for cognitive science.
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